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Abstract 
 
Within the discussion of ethics and economics some have considered designing a code of ethics for economists. But 
the idea of such a code is potentially problematic from a pluralist standpoint. Some possibilities are discussed here to 
show that any code concerning the behaviour of economists presumes a particular view of human nature and thus of 
professionalism. Further, issues of socio-economic power in the profession pose problems for the interpretation and 
implementation of some possible principles, notably those referring to standards of competence and truth-seeking. It 
is therefore concluded that any code of ethics should take the form of general guidelines, with primacy given to the 
ethics of pluralism: tolerance, even-handedness and open-mindedness, on which the interpretation of all other ethical 
considerations rests.  
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Introduction 
 
It is not unusual for parallels to be drawn between economics and medicine, using the metaphor of 
economist as doctor and the economy as patient. In these terms, the patient is sick as a result of the 
financial and economic crisis which began in 2007, and questions are being raised about how far the 
doctor is responsible. The issue of responsibility for the crisis has become more pointed, not only as the 
economic and social costs have continued to rise, but also as the distribution of income in Western 
economies has continued to become more unequal. But while economists are among those who might be 
held responsible, not only for not predicting the crisis but also for causing it, we have not apparently 
borne any costs. Indeed Gillies (2012) points out that economics achieved a higher average score than 
all other disciplines in the UK’s 2008 research assessment exercise. But, unlike doctors, economists do 
not have a code of ethics. If economists had followed an ethical code, would economic crises be 
prevented?  
But how far do economists really resemble doctors? We start the discussion of a code of ethics 
for economists by focusing on a narrow domain of application, academic publication. The focus then is on 
economics purely as an academic discipline, i.e. unlike the understanding of medicine as a profession. 
Academic economists according to this view operate in a different sphere from the policy-making which 
has direct consequences for real experience. But, even when economists have no direct contact with 
policy-makers, it can only be maintained that academic research raises no ethical issues if it is a purely 
technical exercise. An alternative view of economics is that it has real consequences which are the 
outcome of the values embedded in economic theory. These consequences arise not only from policy  
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action resulting from economic advice but also from the way in which economists’ framing1 of the 
economy influences the framing of the economy in society as a whole, and thus influences economic 
behaviour. According to this view, economists do have ethical responsibilities which extend beyond 
narrow academic practice. 
How far economists are seen to have professional responsibilities therefore depends on the 
understanding of the nature and status of economic knowledge, i.e. epistemology. The purpose of this 
paper is therefore to address the possibilities for a code of ethics for economists specifically in 
epistemological terms. It will be argued that a cautious approach should be taken to putting together a 
code of ethics on the grounds that any code might lead to further discrimination against pluralist 
economics if interpreted from a monist perspective. The stance taken here is one of pluralism, and the 
argument will be developed that all other principles of a code of ethics be understood in terms of, and 
conditioned by, an overriding pluralist ethic.  
The discussion starts with ethics in relations among economists themselves, ranging from the 
narrow domain of academic publication to judgements as to academic merit. Here we see that the 
epistemology of economics is already relevant. The discussion is then extended to address the ethics 
surrounding economists’ relations with those who draw on their advice for policy-making and for society 
at large, which is influenced by economic expertise. We focus on three of the principles which are often 
proposed to govern these relations: ‘put social interest before personal interest’, ‘pursue and state the 
truth’ (and the related principles of seriousness and competence in research) and ‘do no harm’. Not only 
do these principles encapsulate much of the discussion around codes of ethics beyond the narrow 
orthodox agenda, but they also serve to illustrate how the interpretation of principles, and therefore their 
application, depends on epistemology. The discussion ends with the principle of pluralism, which is put 
forward as an overarching principle to govern the interpretation of all other principles.  
 
 
Ethics Among Economists 
 
While there has long been discussion of ethics with respect to the content of economics, the ethics of 
economists themselves has received scant attention. But attention to the issue of economists’ ethical 
responsibilities, informed particularly by the work of DeMartino (2010), has increased in recent years. 
One concrete outcome has been the American Economics Association (AEA) requirement from 2012 that 
authors publicly disclose any potential conflict of interest.  
Some other principles of good scholarly practice in publication are already applied as standard: 
not to plagiarise, not to be abusive and not to be libellous, for example. But new ethical issues are 
emerging around scholarly practice in publication because of the way in which research funding is being 
organised around research rankings. In particular, these rankings are increasingly being conducted on 
the basis of bibliometrics, including citation counts and authorship counts. The incentives have therefore 
increased to manipulate these for personal career purposes.2 Any code of conduct should therefore 
include an injunction against manipulating citations and authorship. 
For an orthodox economist, the discussion of professional ethics would not go much further. 
Academic economics is regarded as a technical discipline, applying an established methodology, which 
provides value-free input to policy decisions. So the only ethical issues to arise relate to scholarly 
practice, and these are narrowly understood in terms of the type of principles outlined above. But the view 
1 The general meaning of the term ‘framing’ refers to the way in which something is presented and thus perceived. In discourse 
analysis it refers more specifically to what is included and what is excluded. At a deep level, we frame our understanding of the 
world on the basis of what Searle (1995) calls background, of which we are largely unconscious. In economics, the usual application 
of the framing concept is to the presentation of rational choice problems, and has been applied particularly to financial markets 
within the new behavioural finance, following the lead of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
2 I am grateful to Alessandro Roncaglia for pointing this out. 
 
Economic Thought 2.1:20-29, 2013 21   
                                                        
 World Economics Association  
that economics is value-free and that it is settled how best to pursue it has been widely contested, such 
that the scope for ethical issues becomes more extensive.  
More generally it is critical for relations between economists whether or not the epistemology 
employed is pluralist. The pluralist epistemology of heterodox economics follows from a shared 
ontological view that the economic system is open; schools of thought within heterodox economics differ 
according to their particular understandings of that open system. But even without those differences there 
is awareness of differences between heterodoxy and orthodoxy (Dow, 2011), the latter being identified 
with a closed-system ontology and epistemology (Lawson, 1997). An open system can only yield 
knowledge which is in general uncertain to some degree, such that no one system of knowledge can be 
demonstrated to be best. Knowledge is therefore organised (as paradigms) within communities each with 
its shared ontology and epistemology, giving the discipline a pluralist structure (Dow, 2004). 
Pluralism itself raises additional, wider ethical issues among economists surrounding publication, 
given the significance of publication outlets for the organisation of the discipline.3 The dominance in 
research assessment of orthodox publication outlets means that the power of the orthodoxy is 
reproduced in paper selection. While heterodox papers fare badly by the standards of orthodox 
methodology, this is treated as a value-free scientific judgement by orthodox editors. For heterodox 
authors this exclusive focus on orthodox methodology in fact involves a methodological value judgement 
which amounts to discrimination against alternative approaches.4 Indeed, as Gillies (2012) argues, the 
degree of pluralism becomes endogenous in the sense that publications are a key factor in hiring, 
promotion and curriculum and therefore influence the representation of different (pluralist) schools of 
thought in economics (Gillies, 2012: 33-40). 
The pluralist structure of economics would be relevant therefore if we were to consider an ethical 
principle with respect to career advancement on the basis purely of merit, since the notion of merit 
depends on epistemology. While most of the arguments for pluralism have been epistemological,5 
pluralism has also been advocated on ethical grounds (McCloskey, 2004, Screpanti, 1997). It is a matter 
of civilised behaviour to respect difference. But the pluralist ethic bites further in standing against 
discrimination simply on grounds of difference. We return to the pluralist ethic after considering some 
other possible principles for a code of ethics.    
 
 
Ethics for the Economist as Explicit and Implicit Advisor 
 
Ethical issues extend beyond relations within the discipline itself, such that there has been pressure for 
economists to go further than the narrow interpretation of ethical issues adopted by the AEA. DeMartino 
advocates an economists’ oath, while others have considered a code of conduct (see Bartlett, 2009, for a 
review). The purpose is to establish principles for good practice in the profession, not just the limited 
disclosure of information after the fact required by the AEA. 
Epistemology is important not only within the discipline but also for economists’ relations with 
bodies which they advise. It matters for policy design whether or not there is a range of theoretical 
approaches and how much uncertainty is attached to any one set of advice. But it is also important for 
this discussion that, while mainstream economics is presented as value-free, heterodox economists see 
all of economics as being value-laden, such that the content of methodology, theory and policy advice 
already reflects a set of values (see e.g. Neves and Caldas, eds, 2012). There are differences too (within 
3 Here we will treat pluralist economics and heterodox economics as coterminous (Dow 2011). 
4 See Backhouse (2010) for a discussion of methodological ideology, and see Lee (2009) and Gillies (2012) for evidence of 
discrimination against heterodox economics in the UK.  
5 See e.g. Salanti and Screpant, eds (1997), Fullbrook, ed. (2008) and Garnett, Olsen and Starr, eds (2010) for a range of recent 
discussions of pluralism at a range of levels. 
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heterodox economics as well as between orthodox economics and heterodox economics) in the view 
taken of human nature which, in turn, refer crucially to the knowledge of agents and how they cope with 
uncertainty. This is relevant not only to the content of economic theory but also to the way we understand 
the behaviour of economists themselves.  
Epistemology also enters into economists’ relations with society at large, not just in terms of the 
impact of policy advice, but also in terms of the way they influence social understanding of economic 
issues. A pluralist approach departs from the prevalent orthodox view of facts being unitary and objective 
and of one best theoretical understanding being achievable. The scope of ethical issues outside 
economics itself is thus extensive. This includes the issue of whether or not economists actually accept 
responsibility for their influence. 
In the more detailed analysis below on the ethics surrounding economists’ relations outside the 
discipline, we focus on three of the principles which are often proposed to govern these relations: ‘put 
social interest before personal interest’, ‘pursue and state the truth’ (and principles related to seriousness 
and competence in research) and ‘do no harm’. Not only do these principles encapsulate much of the 
discussion around codes of ethics beyond the narrow orthodox agenda, but they also serve to illustrate 
how the interpretation of principles, and therefore their application, depend on epistemology. A fourth 
principle, advocating pluralism, is put forward as an overarching principle to govern the interpretation of 
the other principles.  
 
Put Social Interest Before Personal Interest  
For most professions, a standard ethical principle is that a course of action not be advocated simply 
because it would serve the interests of the professional rather than the seeker of advice. This appears to 
be relatively straightforward: an academic economist should not advocate a government policy which 
would benefit university funding, or the tax treatment of academic salaries, for example, unless this was 
incidental to other compelling arguments about social benefit. This type of thinking lies behind the AEA 
requirement for authors’ disclosures of potential conflicts of interest in their publications. 
The introduction of this principle is welcome as it serves to address the problem of economic 
research results being influenced by the body which funded the research. The disclosure is designed to 
address any problem of asymmetric information - that the seeker of advice is not otherwise equipped to 
understand that the economist may be serving her own financial interests (through promoting the 
interests of the funder). Indeed this was the context of the first reference to moral hazard in economics of 
which I am aware – Arrow’s (1963) argument for regulation of the medical profession to prevent specialist 
providers from pursuing self-interest by taking advantage of their less-informed patients and funders.  
But the disclosure rule only goes some way towards addressing any conflict between personal 
interest and social interest. It is only satisfactory from the perspective of the epistemology of orthodox 
economics. According to this view complete information is available in principle; incomplete information is 
therefore due to some impediment, such as concealment, which makes information asymmetric. 
Disclosure therefore removes the asymmetry such that it becomes clear whether or not there has been 
conflict of interest. Second, since economics is regarded as a technical discipline with one best 
methodology capable of yielding one best set of policy advice, it is straightforward to detect distortion of 
research results. Third, orthodox economics is based on the assumption that individuals are rationally 
calculative (indeed instrumental and opportunistic) with respect to their own interests, such that it can 
safely be concluded that any incentive to present research results in such a way as to serve personal 
interests will have the predicted outcome. 
But a pluralist epistemology supports the possibility of a range of ways of conducting and 
interpreting research, obfuscating the scope to identify where bias may lie, and indeed what is meant by 
‘bias’. What may be seen as bias from an orthodox perspective may simply reflect difference of 
epistemology. Thus for example it is common for heterodox economics to be dismissed as being 
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ideological, in contrast to orthodox perceptions of their own approach as being objective and ‘scientific’. 
But if theorising itself inevitably involves values then such a separation is not possible and even the 
notion of ‘social benefit’ is value-laden (potentially coinciding with the adviser’s class interests, for 
example). Since the open-system epistemology of heterodox economics implies that values are already 
embedded in choice of methodology and theory, all advice must be coloured by the perspective (including 
the ethical perspective) of the adviser. The good adviser will take pains to explain this perspective, so that 
at least it can be taken into account. This is a much broader form of disclosure, which more fully 
addresses the issue of concealing the potential for conflict of interest. 
But the adviser’s ethics will in many cases influence her to prioritise social benefit over personal 
interest in any case. Indeed some heterodox schools of thought6 emphasise the importance of social 
conventions as a guide to individual behaviour. But, if individuals are governed by social convention to 
prioritise social benefit, there is a real danger that a detailed code of ethics which specifies rules will in 
fact reinforce a different social convention based on an expectation of behaviour (if unconstrained) along 
the lines of rational economic man. For those economists whose behaviour has been governed by 
professional conventions addressed to social benefit, the increasing incidence of explicit-rule-based and 
target-oriented employment conditions may actually undermine those conventions and thus 
professionalism. The aim of rules and targets may well be to induce more desirable professional 
behaviour for social benefit. But professionalism relies on trust, while rules and targets indicate a lack of 
trust. An orthodox approach to rules assumes that behaviour only responds to incentives with respect to 
narrow self interest (such as career advancement). Once the trust-based conventions are eroded, the 
next generation of economists are encouraged to guide their behaviour by the rules which have 
supplanted the conventions, responding to the expectation of self-interested motivation. In other words, 
just as many economics students may be seen to be socialised into behaving as ‘rational economic men’, 
academic economists may be socialised in the same way. 
Any code of ethics therefore needs to be approached carefully, addressing the scope for conflict 
of interest in a subject where values are so deeply embedded, but also recognising that the social norm 
for professional behaviour is not to pursue self interest. What would be more appropriate would be stating 
a general principle encouraging professional behaviour among economists, including integrity with 
respect to not prioritising personal interest. The code of ethics would thus aim to specify and re-establish 
conventions as to professionalism with respect to pursuit of social benefit. Just as heterodox (particularly 
institutionalist) analysis emphasises the role of social trust in underpinning economic activity, so we 
should emphasise the role of trust in professionalism.                                                              
 
Pursue and State the Truth  
We have seen that the very nature and identification of conflict of interest in policy advice is a matter for 
discussion on epistemological grounds. The discussion above has opened up the whole question of the 
nature and purpose of economic research. Having started with what at first glance seemed like a 
straightforward question of academic integrity, it becomes apparent that the ethical issues facing 
economists are much more extensive and more complex than they might at first appear. It is not just a 
matter of whether or not research is distorted for personal gain, but how research is assessed more 
generally.7 
Again we find that an ethical principle which is at first sight appealing – pursue and state the truth 
– becomes problematic when we consider how different epistemologies lead to different interpretations. If 
the economy is an open system such that no one approach can provide a demonstrably true, or even 
6 Notably institutionalists and Post Keynesians (see Hodgson, 1988, and Runde and Mizuhara, eds, 2003, respectively).  
7 Research assessment itself is increasingly being directly connected to research funding across a range of countries. The 
epistemological principles by which it is conducted in turn influence decisions on hiring, research funding and curriculum which 
feeds back into the epistemology of the discipline. Gillies (2012) makes a compelling argument that monist assessment exercises 
increase monism in the discipline. 
 
Economic Thought 2.1:20-29, 2013 24   
                                                        
 World Economics Association  
best, account, then there are bound to be differences of opinion as to the best policy advice. A pluralist is 
duty bound to argue for her preferred policy advice, but knows that it is a matter of persuasion; its 
superiority cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of other perspectives.  
In contrast, the conventional orthodox discussion presumes that the expert knows the 
consequences of a course of policy action. If economics is, as the conventional mainstream approach 
would suggest, a purely technical subject, then the ethical issues are limited. ‘Pursue and state the truth’ 
becomes a straightforward matter of employing the established methodology and stating the results. The 
analysis might involve imposing particular restrictions on established models, and these should be stated 
alongside the results. But since the underlying framework is taken as given, no other assumptions tend to 
be noted along with the results. As Colander (2002) suggested, there would be a distinction between this 
technical economic analysis and a separate exercise in political economy which engages with such 
matters as institutional detail, politics and ethics.8   
Once a range of frameworks is considered, this approach to policy advice is no longer 
acceptable. The assumptions need to be spelled out no matter which framework is employed, in order for 
policy-makers to exercise their judgement. But in any case, in addition to accepting that theory is value-
laden, a heterodox perspective encompasses the interconnections between economic relations and other 
aspects of socio-political life (each heterodox school of thought adopting its own focus). Heterodox 
economic theory then already includes the elements of political economy which are part of the application 
of theory to policy. The economist is not seen just as a technocratic expert who produces results as input 
to the political process, but as someone who designs theory specifically to allow it to connect with other 
aspects of the context of the policy issue at hand.  
Because the results of heterodox analysis are not expressed as deductions from a formal 
mathematical model, they are seen by orthodox economics as falling outside economic theory, and 
therefore not candidates for ‘truth’. While a heterodox economist would regard this as a matter for debate, 
an orthodox economist does not because effectively she defines the discipline by its (formal deductivist) 
method. Thus encouraging economists to pursue truth and to communicate that truth presumes some 
shared view as to what the truth is and how we might pursue it (see further Bartlett, 2009).9 We may all 
share the view that we should aim to uncover true causal mechanisms in order to suggest appropriate 
policies, even although we can never demonstrate that we have identified truth in any absolute sense. 
But from a pluralist perspective there are different approaches to economics which generate different 
accounts. Each group of economists may be convinced that their account is closer to the truth, but there 
is no independent way of settling the matter.  
Again, if there is to be a code of ethics, it would be very dangerous to be any more specific than a 
general injunction to pursue truth and to communicate conclusions. Any more specific rules invite censure 
by the dominant group of the type of analysis pursued by other groups. Effectively that is what we have 
seen in the national exercises in research assessment.  
The same applies to a variant of this principle, which is to be serious in research activity. With its 
methodology being its defining characteristic, orthodox economics would suggest that seriousness be 
interpreted with respect to application of that methodology. In the same way, rigour is understood to be 
coterminous with mathematical consistency. For heterodox economists, seriousness is related much 
more to the subject matter (both in terms of the nature of the subject matter and also what is regarded as 
the policy priorities). Rigour is thus open to a wider range of meanings. In particular theory can be 
assessed in terms of how closely it fits with the subject matter. Lawson (1997) in particular advocates 
open-system epistemology in order to be consistent with an open-system ontology. In these terms, rigour 
refers to ontological consistency rather than internal formal mathematical consistency.  
8 Indeed he regrets the encroachment of value judgements into theory textbooks; see Colander (2005). 
9 As Radford (2011) points out, there is not even agreement on the subject matter of economics. 
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A further related principle which might come under the same heading is to ensure competence in 
pursuing and communicating truth (as suggested by Bartlett, 2009, for example). This is something even 
more evidently open to unwarranted influence by mainstream economics. Economists in the UK 
academic system for example have had extensive experience of peer review of research and teaching 
(with respect to centrally-set benchmarks as to the curriculum) which defines competence substantively 
with respect to mainstream methodology (see Lee 2009: Part II).  
The experience of such exercises demonstrates the dangers of the application of one set of 
epistemological criteria to schools of thought based on different approaches. It therefore illustrates why a 
code of ethics which did not take epistemological issues into account could provide even more scope for 
heterodox economics to be suppressed. But this experience also illustrates how mistaken it is to assume 
that individual economists (or anyone else) are calculatively-rational optimisers and thus to attempt to 
induce professional behaviour by means of incentives which appeal to narrow self-interest. The strength 
of heterodox economics in spite of the incentives to take an orthodox approach is evidence in itself. 
Detailed procedures to ensure competence (and promote excellence) according only to one approach, far 
from promoting professionalism, threaten it by presuming a lack of trust in academic judgement. 
 
Do No Harm  
Orthodox economists may present themselves as technocrats, simply providing advice to which others 
can apply their value systems, and have been quite successful in persuading others to see them in this 
light. But even in these terms, the public has seen economists as bearing some responsibility for the 
crisis. Economic theory provided support for confidence in the capacity for efficient financial markets to 
produce socially-optimal outcomes with markedly reduced regulation. In other words economists, like 
medical professionals, have been authoritative experts whose theories have had real consequences. By 
encouraging the conditions for the crisis, economists have therefore done harm. 
A specific principle advocated by DeMartino (2010) (see also Radford, 2011) is the equivalent of 
the medical principle: do no harm. As DeMartino (2007) points out, the mainstream approach to 
economics often promotes particular policies according to the ‘maxi-max’ principle of choosing the policy 
for which one of the range of predicted possible outcomes is best. In other words, a value has been 
introduced into the theory (in addition to the values embedded in the overall framework). Some of the 
mainstream policy literature (particularly that on monetary policy) has employed a different value by 
taking a loss-minimisation approach which aims to limit worst-case harm. Nevertheless in both cases it is 
presumed that the range of gains and losses is known, allowing policy selection by some rule or other. 
Other things being equal, the policy maker can assess the value being imported. 
But, within a heterodox epistemology which focuses on the uncertainty of knowledge, there is 
some scope for predicting tendencies as the outcome of policies, but not the quantifiable probability 
distribution of outcomes; and indeed there may well be countervailing tendencies to compound the 
problem of prediction. The value judgement for the policy-maker is much less clear-cut, requiring 
judgement about likely outcomes. It also requires judgement as to the possible range of outcomes. It is 
notable that the worst-case scenario of a crisis was not part of the range to which loss-minimisation was 
applied in orthodox models. Policy advice using a heterodox approach therefore draws on judgement 
about the degree of confidence in general predictions about the outcome of policy, with an awareness of 
the scope for non-deterministic structural shifts. 
As DeMartino himself accepts, a ‘do no harm’ principle encourages caution. But this is only one 
possible response, which accords more with the Austrian approach than the Post Keynesian approach. 
Hayek and Keynes shared the view that knowledge is in general held with uncertainty but differed on the 
implications they drew for the role of economists as policy advisers (Greer, 2000). Hayek (1974) was 
particularly critical, on epistemological grounds, of economists presenting themselves as experts. As a 
result of the limitations on their knowledge compared to those engaged in economic activity, Hayek 
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discouraged policy activism; he argued that policy-makers and their advisers could never have enough 
knowledge to justify action (see e.g. Hayek, 1960, and 1973-9). In contrast, Keynes’s epistemology was 
based on his Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921), where his focus was on how action was justified in 
spite of uncertainty. He analysed the grounds for belief on which action is based; these grounds were 
understood as extending well beyond rationalism. He argued later in relation to the investment decision 
that rationalism justified inaction (Keynes, 1936: chs 11 and 12). By constructing a theory which was 
general in the sense of addressing the general uncertainty of knowledge, Keynes provided reasons for 
government to act even under uncertainty; these reasons reduced the government’s uncertainty, 
providing the basis for actions which would in turn reduce uncertainty in the economy. It was a matter of 
judgement to design policy which, as far as it was reasonable to expect, would do no harm (see further 
O’Donnell, 1989).  
Thus the ‘do no harm’ principle too is open to different interpretations depending on approach to 
economics, and is only suitable as a general principle, not for a set of detailed rules for  
professional conduct. 
 
 
The Pluralist Ethic 
 
All the issues raised above arise from the pluralist understanding of economics and the fact that the 
profession is dominated by an orthodox economics which does not share this understanding. Questions 
of human nature and of knowledge therefore colour the way in which any principle is going to be 
interpreted. As long as one grouping dominates economics and does not recognise these pluralist 
concerns, any detailed code of ethics could be very dangerous for pluralists.  
The position of heterodox economics within economics is a product of the mainstream formal 
deductivist methodology as a way of defining economics. The most important professional ethic for 
heterodox economists therefore, I would suggest, is the ethic of pluralism itself (see Screpanti, 1997). 
There are epistemological arguments for fostering a plurality of approaches in economics. But there is a 
decisive ethical argument for acknowledging and embracing such plurality: the argument for economists 
to be courteous even when they differ, to be even-handed in considering different arguments and to be 
open-minded in allowing for different possibilities. This is an argument for ‘good conversation’, as put 
forward by McCloskey (see eg 1994: 99). It is not an argument for allowing any idea to go unchallenged – 
far from it. Rather, given that critical analysis could be said to be the hallmark of science, the pluralist 
ethic sets the broad ground rules for criticism. The third ground rule noted above (open-mindedness) is 
perhaps the most important, since it urges economists to raise their awareness of alternative approaches. 
It has been perhaps the most powerful and most damaging stance of orthodox economics to define the 
discipline in such a way as to preclude much of heterodox economics from the discussion on the grounds 
that it falls outside the discipline. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Pluralism makes it virtually impossible to specify a neutral detailed code of ethics with respect to 
professionalism in economics. Nevertheless it has been argued here that the ethical issues surrounding 
the practice of economics are wide-ranging and complex. Most important, pluralism challenges the 
orthodox framing of economics as a purely technical discipline rather than as a profession with a duty of 
care for the economy, applying theory which embodies value judgements. Further, the orthodox narrative 
supports a monist methodology which makes it difficult for heterodox economics to flourish, in a self-
reinforcing process.  
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To highlight the ethical aspects of economic practice in a code of ethics would go some way to 
addressing these issues. But because interpretation of any detailed injunction or prohibition depends on 
epistemology, the wording needs to be carefully designed to prevent misuse of a code of ethics as a 
further mechanism to suppress pluralism. Otherwise the implementation of a detailed code of ethics by 
the dominant orthodox group of economists could further constrain heterodox economics by imposing an 
orthodox view of human behaviour, of truth and of predicting the consequences of policy. In particular, 
detailed codes of ethics pose a distinct risk of eroding professionalism-as-a-social-convention by 
presuming rational optimising individualistic behaviour to be the norm. On the other hand, a code of 
ethics in the form of general guidelines could be an important positive step in the direction of re-
establishing professional conventions in economics. 
But the main conclusion is that pluralism itself should be the focus of our discussion of ethics. It is 
pluralism which distinguishes heterodox economics and it is pluralism which makes detailed codes of 
ethics problematic. Other principles included in a code of ethics should therefore be understood and 
applied in the spirit of the principle of pluralism.  
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